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Abstract 
The global financial crisis has affected almost all countries in the world. The crisis has hit European economies 
unprecedentedly hard and its effects have occurred in two phases. The first phase is the economic recession following 
the global economic downturn. The second phase is the so-called sovereign debt crisis which started in Greece firstly 
and then appeared in Ireland and Portugal. Like many other countries and organizations, European Union (EU) has 
also developed strategies in order to tackle the challenges of the crisis. This paper attempted to investigate the 
strategic initiatives of EU for the economic recovery in Europe. The results of this investigation show that EU’s 
recovery strategies have been executed in two ways: the preservation of Member States’ financial stability and the 
enhancement of economic governance inside EU. Nevertheless the lack of a political union, in particular the 
supranational governance of economy policy is delaying the recovery of the EU’s economy and causing the 
contagion of sovereign debt problems in Member States of euro. 
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1. Introduction  
2007-2008 global financial crisis, widely referred as to the worst financial and economic shock since 
the Great Depression has revealed many serious deficiencies in the global financial system. The 
consequences of the crisis led governments and international institutions to act cooperatively to restore the 
confidence in markets through several strategies. There is a large consensus that more structural reforms 
are needed to achieve a transparent functioning of markets. 
As a major player in the global financial landscape, European Union (EU) has also taken a set of 
strategic actions during the global financial crisis. The recovery strategies of EU can be categorized under 
two headings; the preservation of Member States’ financial stability and the enhancement of economic 
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governance inside EU. In the first phase of the crisis, European states in coordination with European 
Union tried to stabilize markets via injecting liquidity into the banks with high level of impaired assets. In 
the second phase, after the eruption of sovereign debt crisis in some Member States, they took new 
measures for the stabilization and governance of macroeconomic conditions in Europe.  
Despite all efforts, the progress of the recovery from the crisis in Europe has lagged behind as 
compared to other advanced economies. The cause of this gradual recovery is definitely the sovereign 
debt problems of Member States in the euro area. Moreover, the lack of coordination among Member 
States and a monetary union without a fiscal union has reduced the effectiveness of strategies.  
This paper will attempt to investigate the strategic initiatives of EU for the economic recovery in 
Europe. In this regard this paper has been divided into three parts. The first section gives an overview of 
global financial crisis and its effect on EU countries economic crisis in 2010, particularly its causes and 
consequences. The second sections deals with European sovereign debt crisis and its connection to global 
financial crisis. Finally, in the last section the EU’s strategic steps that have been taken towards economic 
recovery will be discussed.  
2. 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis and Its Effect on EU Countries  
European Union has been constructed on mainly economic concerns. Since the establishment of 
European Economic Community in 1957, economic integration has been deepened and widened year by 
year. Second half of the 1980s were the beginning of significant developments. The Single European Act 
was introduced in 1985 with an ambitious target to finalize full-functioning internal market. Following the 
completion of internal market in 1992 the next step was to develop monetary union. In this regard, the 
euro comes into force in 1999. However, soon after its adoption, internal problems arose because of the 
difficult management of such diverse economies with a single currency. One after another, many countries 
breached the rules that were set in Stability and Growth Pact, a regulation on effective coordination of 
fiscal discipline in Member States of euro zone. [1, 2] 
During 2000s, European economies performed well until the global financial crisis hit the Member 
States. [3, 4] The effects of the crisis in Europe occurred in two phases. The first phase is the economic 
recession following the global financial crisis. The second phase is the so-called sovereign debt crisis 
which started in Greece firstly and then appeared in Ireland and Portugal. 
Early signs of crisis had emerged in the summer of 2007, when the number of delinquent borrowers of 
sub-prime mortgage loans has increased dramatically in United States. A dramatic decrease in mortgage 
payments and the resulting rapid devaluation of mortgage-backed securities led to the collapse of the 
global financial system. In September 2008, the default of Lehman Brothers, one of the major players in 
mortgage-backed securities market,  and the bailout of American International Group, one of the largest 
insurant of these complex financial products, has tumbled the markets all over the world. [5] 
An increasing amount of literature has been published on global financial crisis. Most of these studies 
have investigated the possible causes of the crisis and its effects on developed and emerging economies. 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff [6], this crisis has many commonalities with the previous crises in 
terms of equity market trends, growth slowdowns, housing price changes, and public debt levels.  The 
roots of the crisis can be stretched back to financial deregulation movement which started in the beginning 
of 1980s. Crotty [7] argues that this “new financial architecture” based on “light regulation” of financial 
intermediaries has allowed investment banks to expand their activities with innovative financial 
instruments. As argued by Allen and Carletti [8]; after the failure of dot-com bubble in the late 1990s, the 
expansionary monetary policies of central banks increased the risk appetite of commercial and investment 
banks. As a result of the lower cost of financing, financial sector dominated the US economy in 2000s. 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) indicates in its report that the profitability of financial sector 
has been doubled in the last three decades. [9] 
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The consequences of the crisis were dramatic for the world economy. In 2009 world output fell by 
0,6% and world trade fell by 11%. In advanced economies GDP dropped by 3.2 % in 2009. [10] Claessens 
et al. [11] provide a comprehensive account of the cross-country experiences during the crisis. They 
indicate that the most affected group of countries were those which share strong links with US financial 
markets. Then comes the countries with domestic housing bubbles accompanied by heavy external 
financing. And the last group are small countries whose economies are driven mainly by the exports.  
EU countries are the most severe affected countries during the financial crisis. Real GDP is to drop by 
4.2 % in 2009. In some central and eastern Member States, GDP has declined between 8% and 18%. The 
unemployment rate of euro area increased from 7.5 % in 2008 to 9.4% in 2010. [12, 10] Global financial 
crisis has exerted the most negative impact on public finances of EU Member States. Budget deficits with 
levels of 7% of GDP on average and public debts over 80% of GDP exceeds the limits (3% and 60 % 
respectively) set by Treaties of EU.[13] Currently, 24 out of 27 Member States have been subject to 
“excessive deficit procedure” which was established by the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure Member 
States obey deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (6%) limit. It is used avoid excessive budgetary deficits of 
Member states in order to build a stable functioning of the European Monetary Union 
Global financial crisis was not the only reason behind the macroeconomic deteriorations, in particular 
sovereign debt problems in EU Member States; however it worsened fiscal manoeuvre capability of them 
and thus lessened their chances to overcome the results of crisis. In the next chapter we will discuss how 
global financial crisis evolved into the sovereign debt crisis in European countries. 
3. European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Connection to Global Financial Crisis  
Up to the present, the linkage between banking crises and debt crises haven’t received sufficient 
attention in the literature. [14] After the outbreak of financial crisis and debt crisis in Europe, the 
researchers begin to treat this issue in much detail. In their recent research, Reinhart and Rogoff [15] 
analysed a comprehensive dataset of the sovereign defaults from 1800s to the late 2000s. They found that 
banking crises often precede or coincide with sovereign debt crisis and increase the probability of 
sovereign default. In a detailed investigation of 2010 EMU sovereign debt crisis, Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas [16] found that after the global credit crunch, markets began to price both macroeconomic 
country risks and other international risks more seriously. They concluded that this shift in pricing 
behaviours caused the crisis in Greece and other European periphery countries. 
Besides the global financial crisis, the conditions in EU countries before the crisis were also 
responsible for the economic downturn. Unproductive use of resources, unsustainable policies in some 
member countries, faulty management of public accounts, institutional organization of European 
Monetary Union, the lack of cooperation among Member States are widely referred as inherent causes of 
the crisis. [17, 13] De Grauwe [18] pointed two ‘fault lines’ which diminishes the credibility of Eurozone; 
the lack of mechanisms which can enhance Member State’s competitiveness, and the lack of mechanisms 
to resolve crises.  
Sovereign debt crisis was firstly unfolded in Greece in November 2009. Pre-existing conditions in 
Greece such as low level of structural reforms and macroeconomic deteriorations undermines the 
Greece’s capability to prevent the shocks of the crisis. [19] After the first quarter of 2009, Greece was 
subject to excessive deficit procedure as specified in Stability and Growth Pact, owing to the forecasted 
deficit at 4.4 % of GDP. However, this estimate was also wrong, because of misreporting of the public 
finance statistics. In November 2009 Greek government announced that its deficit will be 12.7 % of GDP. 
European Union’s first reaction to the case was to determine a schedule for implementation of budgetary 
measures. [20] 
European governments didn’t give a signal for the bailout of Greek economy until March 2010. As a 
result Greek fiscal crisis deepened and its public debt became unsustainable. [21]  Following the March 
2010 meeting of European Council, Eurozone members decided to offer €30 billion for 2010 as three year 
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loans with an interest rate of 5%.  On 2 May 2010, Euro area Member States raised the rescue package to 
€80 billion with a joint support of IMF with a €30 billion stand-by agreement. However, speculative 
attacks against euro had continued and European financial ministers met once more extraordinarily on 9 
May to adopt a comprehensive package to stabilize Euro area. A European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) and a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were created in this regard with a 
total budget of €500 billion to provide financial assistance to Member States in difficulties. 
The financial problems of Greece have spread to other weak economies in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). Ireland requested for financial assistance in November 2009 and most recently, Portugal 
became the third country which applied for an EU bailout. Similar to the Greek rescue package, EU and 
IMF jointly launched a three-year loan amounting to €85 billion for Ireland. However, the details of 
European aid for Portugal haven’t been disclosed yet. 
4. European Union’s Recovery Strategies from the Financial Crisis  
The strategies developed by EU to the financial and economic crises can be categorized under three 
groups: the first group of strategies devoted to the restore of confidence in markets with stimulus plans, 
the second group of strategies developed for the proper supervision and governance of the financial 
system and the third group comprises the strategies to enhance economy policy coordination among 
Member States through economic governance mechanisms.  
Right after the crisis enters the most critical stage in September 2008; European Economic Recovery 
Plan was the first stimulus package introduced by the EU. The strategic objectives of the Plan were to 
recover the economy by considering the long-term objectives such as enhancing competitiveness and 
creating green economy and to mitigate the social costs of the crisis. In order to attain these objectives, 
the Plan proposed a number of strategic actions in accordance with Lisbon Strategy and was supported by 
a budget of 200 billion Euros. [22] 
As the crisis spread the eurozone ‘periphery’ countries, namely Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
were introduced as new mechanisms to avoid financial distress in euro area. Within the framework of 
EFSM the Commission can contract borrowings from financial markets on behalf of the EU, and then 
lend it up to €60 billion to the Member State in financial difficulties. Additionally, EFSF was as a special 
purpose vehicle, which can issue bonds up to €440 billion for lending to Eurozone Member States in 
difficulties. Both EFSM and EFSF were adopted following the Ecofin Council in 9 May 2010, became 
fully operational since August 2010 and will remain in force until June 2013.  After June 2011, European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) will replace ESFM and EFSF as a permanent instrument to safeguard the 
stability of euro area. [23] 
The second group of strategies has started when European Union gave a mandate to a high level group 
chaired by Mr. Larosiere, in order to identify what has to be done to undertake more deep-rooted reforms. 
Based on this Larosiere’s group report, European Commission launched a set of strategies intended to 
constitute a more transparent European financial system. In March 2009 a communication was adopted 
for the formation of European Financial Supervision System.  With the establishment of the new system, 
three existing Committees (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee, Committee of European Securities Regulators) will be 
replaced by more strengthened Authorities, which will operate at European level and in coordination with 
national supervisors.[24] 
In accordance with the Communication of March 2009, European Commission published a second 
communication two months later which details the European Financial Supervisory Framework. 
Commission proposes a system based on two dimensions. The first dimension establishes European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will be responsible for monitoring the macro risks in the financial 
system. The decisions of ESRB will not be binding on Member States, but an action or explanation might 
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be demanded in case they didn’t act on ESRB’s recommendations. The organizational structure of ESRB 
will be composed of members and observers. President and Vice-President of European Central Bank, 
governors of national central banks, chairpersons of three European Supervisory Authorities and one 
person from the European Commission would have a right to vote as members in the ESRB. The 
representatives of national supervisory authorities and chairperson of European and Financial Committee 
would join the organization as observers. [25, 26] 
The second dimension of financial supervision is the European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS). The main objective of ESFS is to identify micro risks stem from financial institutions, other 
sectors’ players or consumers. It transforms three existing Committees of financial regulation into the 
Authorities (European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Pensions Authority and European 
Securities and Markets Authority) with more power and responsibilities. The Authorities can take binding 
decisions when a disagreement occurs between national authorities or actors. The organization of ESFS 
consists of a steering committee, board of supervisors and management board. One representative from 
each authority would work in Steering Committee to determine the cross-sectoral risks. Board of 
Supervisors in each Authority will be composed of the chairperson of that Authority and representatives 
from relevant authorities in Member States. Moreover, a representative of European Commission, of 
ESRC and of EFTA-EEA country would be involved in as observers. A management board will be 
responsible for operational tasks, which comprise national representatives and the Commission. [25, 27] 
European Commission presented legislative proposals for the European Financial Supervisory 
Framework in September 2009 and one year after European Council and European Parliament approved 
the new financial supervision structure. Both ESRB and three Authorities started to work officially in 
January 2011. 
As mentioned above, while dealing with the global financial crisis, Europe has to cope with sovereign-
debt problems of some Member States since November 2009. European Monetary Union has been widely 
criticised because it is based on a single central bank without a common fiscal policy among Member 
States. The lack of supranational fiscal coordination has become more apparent in the absence of 
immediate and mutual response to the Greek crisis. Hence, EU initiates a new strategy to “reinforce 
economic policy coordination” by the invitation of EC Commissioner Olli Rehn in April 2010. [28] EU’s 
new economic governance strategy is based on three pillars; strengthening of Stability and Growth Pact, 
enhancing macroeconomic coordination within EU and harmonisation of national budget frameworks of 
Member States.  
As a fiscal surveillance mechanism of Euro area member states, Stability and Growth Pact plays a key 
role in European economy policy coordination. However recent debt crisis has shown that member states 
couldn’t perform in compliance with rules and principles set by the Pact. To enhance its implementation 
and to avoid the breaches of the rules, Commission set out a strategy that will reinforce so-called the 
“preventive” and “corrective” parts of the SGP.  
The existing preventive arm of SGP operates through stability and convergence programmes in which 
Member States outline medium-term objectives (MTO) of their budgetary positions in accordance with 
the rules of SGP. However, as the current crisis proved, Member States are insufficient to achieve their 
MTO’s. A new tool is added to the existing mechanisms, namely “prudent fiscal policy-making”, which 
ensures that “annual expenditure should not exceed a prudent medium-term rate of growth”. [29] With the 
help of prudent fiscal policy-making it is aimed to use unexpected extra revenues for debt reduction 
instead of spending it.  
On the other hand, the existing corrective arm of SGP is implemented through excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP). EDP is an instrument to prevent excessive deficits and debts of Member States. While 
current EDP mainly focuses on deficit criterion (3% of GDP), the new strategy puts more emphasis on 
debt threshold (60% of GDP). In addition to this, the evolution of debt levels would be monitored more 
tightly. If a Member State’s debt level exceeds 60% criterion, that Member State should take appropriate 
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actions in order to decrease the difference between its debt level and the reference debt values at a rate 
5% per annum over the last three years. [30] 
Both for the breach of preventive and corrective practices, the Commission developed new sanctioning 
mechanisms for the Member States in the euro area. If a Member State fails to adopt preventive actions, 
0.2% of its GDP would be held as an “interest-bearing deposit”. In the case of corrective action, the 
amount deposited would be the same; however, Member States in would not bear any interest. In addition 
to these sanctions, Commission developed a “reverse voting mechanism” in order to strengthen their 
implementations. Through this mechanism, the Commission’s recommendation would be adopted, unless 
Council disapproves of it by the qualified majority. [31] 
The rationale of second pillar’s formation of economic governance is to prevent and correct 
macroeconomic imbalances. The reactions of Member states to the financial turbulences could be wide-
ranging. To manage the process more efficiently, first mechanism introduced is an alert system based on 
Member States’ scoreboards in which a series of macroeconomic indicators represented and analysed. An 
alert threshold would be specified for each indicator that will give a signal to experts for the in-depth 
evaluation of the problematic situation. The evaluation process of the scoreboards would be conducted on 
a regular basis. In-depth reviews can lead to two different outcomes for Member States. The first option is 
to take no action when macroeconomic indicators are stable. The second option is to recommend 
preventive actions if there is a risk of macroeconomic imbalance.  
If macroeconomic imbalances of a Member State produce severe negative consequences for other 
Member States, the mechanism of “excessive imbalance procedure (EIP)” would be put into effect. In 
such cases, Member States are obliged to take a corrective action within a specific time period. Similar to 
implementation of the first mechanism, if the macroeconomic imbalance corrected, EIP will be closed. If 
the Member State took corrective actions, but its effects didn’t occur simultaneously, the procedure will 
be closed but monitoring would be continued. If a failure in implementing corrective action or non-
compliance with the recommendations continued repeatedly, a set of sanctions would be imposed for the 
Member States of euro. [32] A Member State in euro area has to pay 0.1% of its GDP as a yearly fine if it 
fails repeatedly to correct macroeconomic balances under EIP. The decision of enforcement will be taken 
by the reverse voting mechanism.  
Third pillar of economic governance aims to harmonise budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
This encapsulates the convergence of public accounting systems, forecasting methods, numerical fiscal 
rules and transparency. 
All three pillars have been presented in six legislative proposals to the Council of the European Union 
in September 2010, and they are planned to be operational in June 2011 with the consent of European 
Parliament. On the other hand, European Commission has already started the new framework of budget 
surveillance, so-called “European Semester”.  Within the scope of the European Semester, a schedule of 
activities is organised in order to coordinate and evaluate the preliminary draft budgets of Member States. 
It starts each year in January with the adoption Annual Growth Survey, and after a series of reviews and 
debates on national budgets of Member States it lasts in June. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the recent global financial crisis and its connection to European sovereign 
debt crisis in periphery Eurozone member states. In this investigation, the aim was to review EU's 
recovery strategies from the recession.  
During the global financial crisis, EU has helped the financial system through stability mechanism 
programs to solve the liquidity problems. Moreover, the architecture of European financial supervision 
was renewed; the legal infrastructure of Stability and Growth Pact has been strengthened in order to 
overcome weaknesses of fiscal coordination within EU.  
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Global economic recovery started in the last quarter of 2009, but the risk of the “sovereign-debt 
contagion” remains high in Europe. Following the Greek bailout in Mai 2009, Ireland and Portugal has 
also requested EU’s aid because of the rising costs of refinancing their debts through financial markets. In 
addition to this, Spain could be fourth country in seeking assistance as it has the highest unemployment 
rate in Europe and ongoing banking sector problems.
It is clearly evident that the lack of a political union, in particular the supranational governance of 
economy policy is delaying the recovery of the EU’s economy. The pace and extent of the cooperation 
are still determined by domestic political conditions in Member States. Thus, markets do not react fully 
and instantaneously to the bailout packages and other structural reforms and this eventually hinders the 
ability of weaker EMU members to prevent the economic meltdown. 
The current study has only reviewed the recovery strategies of EU; however more research is needed 
when the Commission’s strategic initiatives come into effect entirely in order to better evaluate the impact 
of these strategies on EU member states. 
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